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Chapter 1. VARIETIES OF LANGUAGE 
 
Unit 1.  Characteristics of World Englishes 
There is little question that English is the most widely taught, read, 
and spoken language that the world has ever known. It may seem strange, 
on some moments' reflection, that the native language of a relatively small 
island nation could have developed and spread to this status. Its path was 
foreseen, however, by John Adams, who, in the late eighteenth century, 
made the following insightful prophesy: English will be the most 
respectable language in the world and the most universally read and 
spoken in the next century, if not before the close of this one. 
The global spread of English has been viewed as two diasporas. The 
first diaspora involved migrations of substantial numbers of English 
speakers from the present British Isles to, for example, Australia, New 
Zealand, and North America. Those English users who left the old country 
for new ones brought with them the resource of language and its potentials 
for change which are always with us, though we are not often called upon 
to contemplate them explicitly. The language that they brought with them 
changed over time, to be sure, but no more or less substantially or rapidly 
than the language “at home”, for all languages evolve in the natural course 
of time and use. 
The second diaspora of English, in the colonial contexts of Asia and 
Africa, entailed transportation of the language, but only to a small extent 
transportation of English-speaking people. Thus, the language was brought 
into new sociocultural contexts by a very small number of users; neverthe-
less, English became extremely important and useful to the much larger 
local populations, who have continued to expand the roles of English, often 
with greater vigor in postcolonial times. 
Along with the mere numbers, it is important to note that these 
language-contact situations involved English and genetically unrelated and 
widely divergent Asian and African languages and, concomitantly, their 
cultures, both of which were far removed from the experience and common 
presuppositions of the native English speakers. These contact situations 
have had striking and lasting effects on English in these regions, so that 
although these contemporary Englishes have much in common, they are 
also unique in their grammatical innovations and tolerances, lexis, 
pronunciations, idioms, and discourse. 
Everyone is cognizant of the notion of dialects of languages, 
including English. Dialects are characterized by identifiable differences vis-
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a-vis other dialects, in pronunciation, lexical choice or usage, grammar, and 
so on; we speak easily of southern English, New England English, 
American English, and British English. These are all dialects: types of 
English that are identified with the residents of particular places. There are 
also age, gender, and other sorts of group-related dialects − as is so often 
the case with language-evolved issues, the label depends upon the question 
that is being addressed. Any speaker can be said to speak various dialects, 
depending upon the circumstances of a discussion: in terms of geography, 
one of the authors grew up speaking southern American English; in terms 
of profession and education, both authors speak standard English; and so 
on. 
The well-known national dialects are not usually referred to as such, 
for the term dialect has acquired various sorts of stigmatized baggage over 
the years. In some speakers' minds, to say that people speak a dialect is 
tantamount to saying that they are provincial, perhaps not well educated,  
though this is neither a necessary nor a proper connotation of dialect in its 
technical meaning. However, because of these negative associations, most 
people nowadays − especially in the United States − use variety to refer to 
a subtype of a language, for example, the American and British varieties of 
English. 
Still, the substitution of one term for another is just that, and “my 
variety versus yours” can still be a point of contention. The implications for 
attitudes about control of the language are extremely hard to overcome. 
Strevens made a cogent and useful distinction between dialect, 
“differences of grammar and vocabulary”, and accent “difference of 
pronunciation”. Strevens notes that we expect to find a consistent pairing of 
dialect and accent in any given area, and he points out that “since dialect + 
accent pairs co-exist in this way it is not surprising that most 
nonspecialists, and even many teachers of English habitually confuse the 
terms dialect and accent, and observe no distinction between them”. 
One key point, then is the following: “In fact, the only cases where 
this strict pairing [of dialect and accent] does not operate are precisely in 
relation to Standard English”. This is why, for example, we are not at all 
surprised when standard English is spoken with various accents in the 
United States by network news anchors and by international politicians on 
both sides of the Atlantic. We recognize fundamental sorts of structural and 
semantic sameness, and are aware of but do not put a high value on 
differences of pronunciation. 
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Commonly accepted varieties of English today include American and 
British, of course, and also Australian, Canadian, and New Zealand. There 
are many national varieties of English in the world today − a sense of their 
extent and distribution can be gained by reviewing a list of countries in 
which English is an official language. Refer to Table 1 which is not 
intended to be an exhaustive list. English may be a coofficial language, or it 
may be, as in the United States, the official language in fact though not in 
law. A more comprehensive list of “territories for which English is a 
significant language” is given by McArthur. 
 
Table 1 − Countries in  which English  has  official  status 
Antigua and 
Barbuda 
Irish Republic  
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
Jamaica 
Australia  Kenya  Seychelles  
Bahamas  Lesotho  Sierra Leone  
Barbados  Liberia  Singapore  
Botswana  Malawi  Tamil  
Brunei  Malta  South Africa  
Cameroon  Mauritius  Surinam  
Canada  New Zealand  Swaziland  
Dominica  Nigeria  Tanzania  
Fiji  Papua New Guinea Trinidad and Tobago  
Gambia  Philippines  Uganda  
Ghana  Puerto Rico  the United Kingdom  
Grenada  St. Christopher  the United States of America  
Guyana  Nevis  Zambia  
India  St. Lucia  Zimbabwe  
 
Unit 2. Types of Variation and Types of Users 
The uses and users of English internationally have been discussed 
profitably in terms of three concentric circles. Briefly, the circles model 
captures the global situation of English in the following way. 
The Inner Circle comprises the old-variety English-using countries, 
where English is the first or dominant language: the United States, Britain, 
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. In these countries though other 
languages surely are spoken, there is seldom if ever a question of any 
language other than English being used in an extensive sense in any public 
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discourse (e.g., in media, government, education, and creative writing). It 
may be significant that in the United States, for example, the Constitution 
does not even bother to mention an official language. That such a statutory 
status has been deemed unnecessary is probably a silent testament to the 
assumed sway of English. Such questions have had to be addressed in 
other, multilingual countries, such as India, Nigeria, and Singapore. 
The Outer Circle comprises countries where English has a long 
history of institutionalized functions and standing as a language of wide 
and important roles in education, governance, literary creativity, and 
popular culture, such as India, Nigeria, Pakistan, Singapore, South Africa, 
and Zambia. India has the third-largest English-using population in the 
world, after the United States and Britain, and Nigeria and the Philippines 
closely follow India. 
The Expanding Circle countries are those in which English has 
various roles and is widely studied but for more specific purposes than in 
the Outer Circle, including (but certainly not limited to) reading knowledge 
for scientific and technical purposes; such countries currently include 
China, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Korea, and Nepal. However, it must be 
remembered that languages have life cycles, particularly in multilingual 
societies, and thus the status of a language is not necessarily permanent. 
This concentric-circle schematization is not merely a heuristic 
comparison or metaphor. Some examination of the various situations and 
case studies of English around the world and of the history of the spread of 
English will convince the reader that the circles model is valid in the senses 
of earlier historical and political contexts, the dynamic diachronic advance 
of English around the world, and the functions and standards to which its 
users relate English in its many current global incarnations. 
It is telling, for example, that English is the associate official 
language or an official language in India, Nigeria, and various other 
countries of the Outer Circle (see Table 1). The sheer numbers of English 
users worldwide are almost unimaginable to the monolingual, monocultural 
English teacher. But it is difficult to define an English user in terms of 
either amount of use or degree of proficiency. Freshman composition 
students at the United States universities, for example, may be monolingual 
speakers of English, yet it is not uncommon − indeed, it is quite usual − to 
hear their professors complaining that they “can't write”, “have limited 
vocabularies”, “have no sense of idiom”, and so on. Indeed, a number of 
committees and commissions have been set up in the United States and 
Britain to address precisely these sorts of concerns. Being labeled a native 
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speaker is of no particular a priori significance, in terms of measuring 
facility with the language. 
 
Unit 3. Societal Multilingualism 
The terms bilingualism and multilingualism have been used 
interchangeably in the literature to refer to the knowledge or use of more 
than one language by an individual or a community. This practice will be 
continued here, but we must allow for the possibility that multilingualism 
may be more than just a magnified version of bilingualism. Multilingualism 
can be, and has been, studied both as an individual and as a societal 
phenomenon. When it is viewed as an individual phenomenon, issues such 
as how one acquires two or more languages in childhood or later, how these 
languages are represented in the mind, and how they are accessed for 
speaking and writing and for comprehension become central. When it is 
viewed as a societal phenomenon, one is concerned with its institutional 
dimensions, that is, with issues such as the status and roles of the languages 
in a given society, attitudes toward languages, determinants of language 
choice, the symbolic and practical uses of the languages, and the 
correlations between language use and social factors such as ethnicity, 
religion, and class. 
Bilingualism is a worldwide phenomenon. Most nations have 
speakers of more than one language. Hundreds of millions of people the 
world over routinely make use of two or three or four languages in their 
daily lives. Furthermore, even the so-called monolinguals also routinely 
switch from one language variety − a regional dialect, the standard 
language, a specialized technical register, a formal or informal style, and so 
on − to another in the course of their daily interactions. According to one 
influential theory, a multilingual's facility in moving from one language to 
another as the occasion demands is but an extension of the monolingual's 
capacity to shift registers and styles. The study of multilingualism, 
therefore, not only focuses on one of the most significant types of language 
use but also has the potential to shed light on language behavior in general. 
There are several types of societal multilingualism. The most 
common type occurs when a country or region consists of several language 
groups, each of which is primarily monolingual. Canada is a good example. 
In such a case, the nation as a whole is multilingual but not all individuals 
are necessarily multilingual. This situation has been referred to as the 
territorial principle of multilingualism. On the other hand, multilingualism 
can be based on the personality principle; that is, where bilingualism is the 
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official policy of a country and most individuals are multilingual. India and 
several countries in East and West Africa are good examples of this type. In 
reality, most multilingual nations exhibit a combination of these two types. 
How do societies become multilingual? There are many reasons. The 
most obvious factor leading to societal multilingualism is migration. 
When speakers of one language settle in an area where another language is 
used and over the years continue to maintain their own language, the result 
is multilingualism. Spanish in the United States is a good example of this. 
Another cause of societal multilingualism is cultural contact. When a 
society imports and assimilates the cultural institutions (e.g., religion or 
literature) of another society, over the years multilingualism may result. 
The use of Arabic and Western European languages, for example, English, 
French, Portuguese, Spanish, and Dutch in Asia, Africa, and Latin America 
bear testimony to this phenomenon. A third reason is annexation, as in the 
case of the French- and Spanish-speaking parts of the United States, and 
colonialism, as in many parts of Latin America, Asia, and Africa, where 
colonial languages such as Spanish, French, and especially English became 
entrenched and continue to play crucial roles long after the cessation of 
colonial rule. Other reasons include the commercial, scientific, and 
technological dependence of the speakers of certain languages on the 
speakers of other languages. 
 
Unit 4.  Verbal Repertoire 
The notion of verbal repertoire is central to the discussion of 
multilingualism, both in the individual and in a society. Verbal repertoire 
refers to the total range of linguistic resources available to an individual or 
a community. For monolingual speakers, this includes the range of 
regional, social, functional, and stylistic varieties that they command, either 
productively (i.e., in speaking or writing) or receptively (i.e., in reading or 
understanding spoken language). In the case of a multilingual individual or 
society, the verbal repertoire is obviously more complex in the sense that it 
encompasses not only varieties of the same language but also entirely 
different languages. It is important to keep in mind that each language in 
the repertoire brings with it its own set of grammatical, lexical, pragmatic, 
and sociolinguistic rules and conventions (norms). 
Pandit's illustration of a day in the linguistic life of a spice merchant 
in India is a classic example of a multilingual's verbal repertoire: A 
Gujarati spice merchant in Bombay uses Kathiawadi (his dialect of 
Gujarati) with his family, Marathi (the local language) in the vegetable 
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market, Kacchi and Konkani in trading circles, Hindi or Hindustani with 
the milkman and at the train station, and even English on formal occasions. 
Such a person may not be highly educated or well versed in linguistic rules, 
but knows enough to be able to use the language(s) for his purposes. 
An important characteristic of multilingualism pointed out by 
Pandit's example is the fact that multilinguals do not necessarily have a 
perfect or native-like command of all the languages (or codes, as these 
languages or language varieties have come to be called) in their verbal 
repertoires. Multilingualism involving balanced, native-like command of all 
the languages in the repertoire is rather uncommon. Typically, 
multilinguals have varying degrees of command of the different languages 
in their repertoires. The differences in competence in the various languages 
might range from command of a few lexical items, formulaic expressions 
such as greetings, and rudimentary conversational skills all the way to 
excellent command of the grammar and vocabulary and specialized 
registers and styles. 
Another major characteristic of multilingual competence might be 
called selective functionality. Multilinguals develop competence in each of 
the codes to the extent that they need it and for the contexts in which each 
of the languages is used. For example, a multilingual might have an 
excellent reading, writing, speaking, and comprehending knowledge of one 
or two languages but might be more comfortable using one language for 
academic or professional purposes and another for intimate or emotional 
expression. This is in part a function of differential command of registers 
(functional varieties) but also of habitual associations between languages 
and contexts. 
Thus, a multilingual's linguistic competence is a composite of many 
partial competences which complement one another to yield a rich and 
complex resource adequate for fulfilling all the life functions. It follows 
that in judging the adequacy of the multilingual's linguistic competence one 
must keep in mind the composite nature of the repertoire. It is neither 
necessary nor common to find native or near-native competence in all the 
languages of a multilingual's repertoire. 
 
Unit 5. Language Choice 
As a discipline, sociolinguistics provides the methodology for 
analysis and description of the interactional contexts: Who uses what 
language with whom and for what purposes? It provides frameworks with 
which to analyze the linguistic choices available to the multilinguals and 
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their reasons for choosing one code from among the several that are 
available to them. One of the basic assumptions in sociolinguistics 
involving multilingual speech communities is that, as stated by Elias-
Olivares: in a heterogeneous speech community, with varying degrees of 
linguistic diversity and social complexity, speakers interact using different 
speech varieties drawn from a repertoire of choices which for the most part 
are not random. On the contrary, the distribution of usage of these choices 
is determined by several factors in the social communicative system of the 
community. 
Given the existence of different languages in the repertoire of a 
society or of a multilingual individual, how and when are the languages 
used? To answer this question, the notion of domains is very important. 
Domains, according to Fishman, explore “who speaks what language to 
whom and when in those speech communities that are characterized by 
widespread and relatively stable multilingualism”. 
Barber has formulated domains at the sociopsychological level. He 
groups the domains as intimate (family), formal (religious-ceremonial), in-
formal (neighborhood), and intergroup (economic and recreational activi-
ties as well as interactions with governmental and legal authority). In the 
research on domains by Fishman and associates, language choice is 
discussed in terms of the following domains: the family, the playground 
and street, the school, the church, literature, the press, the military, the 
courts, and governmental administration. In investigating multilingual 
societies, subsequent researchers have either added to or reduced the 
numbers of domains. 
An examination of how the languages of a multilingual community 
are used reveals a highly sophisticated and efficient pattern. All the 
languages are not used in all the domains. It is believed that certain 
languages are particularly suited to certain domains. 
All the languages in the repertoire of a multilingual community are 
not equally distributed in terms of power, prestige, vitality, or attitude. In 
other words, some languages are more valued than others. This 
phenomenon can be referred to as the asymmetric principle of 
multilingualism. The languages in a multilingual community can be 
viewed as being arranged on a hierarchy. The position of a given language 
on this hierarchy is determined by very pragmatic considerations. The 
larger the number of desired roles a language enables its speakers to play in 
a given society, the higher its place on the hierarchy. The more restricted 
the range of valued roles a language provides, the lower its place on the 
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hierarchy. This principle can be illustrated with some examples from India. 
In the Indian society, the repertoire of an educated multilingual may consist 
of a large number of languages or codes. An individual might speak a rural 
and/or a caste dialect at home with members of the family and people from 
an extended kinship and/or what may be called native place network. Here, 
this dialect or minority language serves essentially to establish an ethnic 
identity; it may have no written literature or even a script. For example, the 
Brahman dialect of Tulu, a Dravidian language, is spoken in the coastal 
areas of the state of Karnataka in South India. It differs considerably from 
the non-Brahman dialect. Neither the non-Brahman nor the Brahman 
dialect is used for writing. Although it is spoken by about two million 
persons, the Tulu language is restricted in its functional range. 
All Tulu speakers are bilingual in the local state language, Kannada, 
which serves as their medium of instruction through the secondary school. 
Kannada has a wider range of roles, as the language of education, 
administration, commerce, media, and literature. Kannada therefore gives 
the Tulu speaker regional identity and statewide mobility. However, even 
Kannada is restricted relative to certain desired roles. In addition to 
learning Kannada, Tulu speakers will learn English at the postprimary 
school level, further widening their linguistic resources. English empowers 
the speaker to gain access to higher technical education, to communicate on 
an interstate (pan-Indian) and international level, and to participate in the 
influential national press and media, and it provides national and 
international mobility as a job candidate. As a marker of sophistication, 
modern knowledge, and access to power, English also bestows a tangible 
competitive advantage and a certain intangible glamour or prestige value. 
However, the Tulu speaker will also study or informally learn Hindi, which 
is the chief medium of popular Indian movies, a useful lingua franca (a 
common language used by speakers of different language backgrounds) for 
communications with North Indian states, and increasingly the official 
language of the federal government. Still, there are roles that none of these 
languages individually, or all of them together, can play satisfactorily. The 
Tulu speaker might also learn the classical language Sanskrit to access, 
preserve, and symbolize the classical lore of India in an enormous range of 
fields from religion through medicine. Nor is this all. Depending on 
lifestyle and networks of business and personal interactions, an individual 
might also learn one or more regional languages, such as Tamil, Telugu, or 
Marathi, which she or he will use with varying degrees of proficiency. 
Thus, in a multilingual's verbal repertoire each language uniquely fulfills 
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certain roles and represents distinct identities, and all of them complement 
one another to serve the complex communicative demands of a pluralistic 
society. 
Thus, the languages of a multilingual community are differentially 
evaluated on the basis of the habitual associations between the languages 
and the domains of their use. If the domains in which a language is used are 
highly valued, then that language is perceived to be highly valued (and 
conversely). For example, the habitual use of Sanskrit in ritualistic and 
intellectual contexts by the most prestigious group in the Indian social 
system over thousands of years has given the language the status of a 
sacred, intellectual language. (But this association also sometimes works to 
its disadvantage: Sanskrit is perceived to be too orthodox, difficult, and 
old-fashioned for everyday purposes). English, on the other hand, because 
of the colonial history and association with currently valued domains of 
higher administration, science and technology, international commerce. 
Western culture and pop entertainment, is perceived as all-powerful and as 
a ticket to upward mobility. However, it is important to keep in mind that 
evaluation of languages in multilingual societies is not always based on 
materialistic criteria. The revival of Hebrew in Israel, the struggle to 
reestablish Catalan and Basque in Spain, the movement to revitalize 
Sanskrit in India, and the continued maintenance of home languages by 
many groups of migrants over several centuries are reminders that factors 
such as tribal, caste, ethnic, and national identities are also powerful forces 
in the use, maintenance, revival, and regulation of languages. Movements, 
often quite successful, now exist in many parts of the world aimed at 
gaining recognition and status for indigenous languages sidelined or 
oppressed during colonial and postcolonial regimes (e.g., in Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Peru).  
These movements typically take the form of a demand for extending 
the functional range of indigenous languages to include domains of power, 
authority, and prestige by their use in, for example, education, 
administration, and the legal system. Con-comitantly, there are efforts to 
prevent hegemonic languages from usurping smaller languages by 
restricting the domains of use of the more prevalent languages. The 
dynamics of language in a multilingual society reflect the evolution of 
power in that society. Thus, the languages of a multilingual society exist in 
a state of organic tension with one another that involves small but 
cumulatively perceptible shifts in functional range. 
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Unit 6.  “Speech Communities” and Languages 
The term speech community is widely used by sociolinguists to 
refer to a community based on language, but linguistic community is also 
used with the same meaning. If speech communities can be delimited, then 
they can be studied, and it may be possible to find interesting differences 
between communities which correlate with differences in their language. 
The study of speech communities has therefore interested linguists for 
some time. However, there has been considerable confusion and 
disagreement over exactly what a speech community is, as the following 
survey shows: 
1.   The simplest definition of “speech community” is that of John 
Lyons: Speech community: all the people who use a given language (or 
dialect). According to this definition, speech communities may overlap 
(where there are bilingual individuals) and need not have any social or 
cultural unity. Clearly it is possible to delimit speech communities in this 
sense only to the extent that it is possible to delimit languages and dialects 
without referring to the community that speaks them. 
2.    A more complex definition is given by Charles Hockett: Each 
language defines a speech community: the whole set of people who 
communicate with each other, either directly or indirectly, via the common 
language. Here the criterion of communication within the community is 
added, so that if two communities both spoke the same language but had no 
contact with each other at all, they would count as different speech 
communities. 
3.   The next definition shifts the emphasis entirely from shared 
language to communication. A simple form of it was given by Leonard 
Bloomfield: A speech community is a group of people who interact by 
means of speech. This leaves open the possibility that some interact by 
means of one language, and others by means of another. This possibility is 
explicitly recognised in the definition given by John Gumperz : We will 
define [linguistic community] as a social group which may be either 
monolingual or multilingual, held together by frequency of social inter-
action patterns and set off from the surrounding areas by weaknesses in the 
lines of communication. 
4.  A later definition by Gumperz, however, introduces the 
requirement that there should be some specifically linguistic differences 
between the members of the speech community and those outside it: The 
speech community: any human aggregate characterised by regular and 
frequent interaction by means of a shared body of verbal signs and set off 
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from similar aggregates by significant differences in language use. Unlike 
definition 2, this does not require that there should be just one language per 
speech community. The effect of putting emphasis on communication and 
interaction, as in these last two definitions, is that different speech 
communities will tend not to overlap much, in contrast with the earlier 
definitions where overlap automatically results from bilingualism. 
5.   A different definition puts the emphasis on shared attitudes and 
knowledge, rather than on shared linguistic behaviour. It is given by 
William Labov: The speech community is not defined by any marked agree-
ment in the use of language elements, so much as by participation in a set 
of shared norms: these norms may be observed in overt types of evaluative 
behaviour, and by the uniformity of abstract patterns of variation which are 
invariant in respect to particular levels of usage. 
Rather similar definitions, referring to shared norms and abstract 
patterns of variation rather than to shared speech behaviour, have been 
given by Dell Hymes and Michael Halliday. It will be seen that this kind of 
definition puts emphasis on the speech community as a group of people 
who feel themselves to be a community in some sense, rather than a group 
which only the linguist and outsider could know about, as in some of the 
earlier definitions. 
6.   Lastly, there is an approach which avoids the term “speech 
community” altogether, but refers to groups in society which have 
distinctive speech characteristics as well as other social characteristics. It 
should be noted that the groups are those which the individual speaker 
perceives to exist, and not necessarily those which a sociologist might 
discover by objective methods; and the groups need not exhaust the whole 
population, but may represent the clear cases of certain social types. This 
approach has been advocated by Robert Le Page: Each individual creates 
the systems for his verbal behaviour so that they shall resemble those of the 
group or groups with which from time to time he may wish to be identified, 
to the extent that a. he can identify the groups, b. he has both opportunity 
and ability to observe and analyse their behavioural systems, c. his 
motivation is sufficiently strong to impel him to choose, and to adapt his 
behaviour accordingly, d. he is still able to adapt his behaviour. 
This is the view according to which individuals “locate themselves in 
a multidimensional space”, the dimensions being defined by the groups 
they can identify in their society. Unlike the “speech communities” defined 
in 3, 4 and 5, these groups very definitely overlap. For instance a child may 
identify groups on the basis of sex, age, geography and race, and each 
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grouping may contribute something to the particular combination of 
linguistic items which they select as their own language. 
Our last quotation, by Dwight Bolinger, identifies these “personal” 
groups as speech communities, and stresses the unlimited amount of 
complexity that is possible: There is no limit to the ways in which human 
beings league themselves together for self-identification, security, gain, 
amusement, worship, or any of the other purposes that are held in common; 
consequently there is no limit to the number and variety of speech 
communities that are to be found in society. 
According to this view, any population (whether of a city, a village 
or whole state) may be expected to contain a very large number of speech 
communities indeed, with overlapping memberships and overlapping 
language systems. Indeed, Le Page's proviso a (to the extent that “he can 
identify the groups”) raises the possibility that different members of the 
population may be aware of different groups. If we take the position that 
speech communities should have some kind of psychological reality for 
their members (as in definition 5 above), then it follows that we must 
identify different speech communities in the same population according to 
the person whose viewpoint we are taking. 
To qualify as a “community”, a set of people presumably needs to be 
distinguished from the rest of the world by more than one property, and 
some of these properties have to be important from the point of view of the 
members' social lives. The question, then, is which of the definitions of 
“speech community” lead to genuine communities in this sense. 
It might be thought that they all do. Even taking the simplest of the 
definitions, according to which a speech community is simply the set of 
people who use a given language or dialect, it is hard to imagine such a 
community having nothing but the common language or dialect to set them 
off from other people − nothing in their culture, nothing to do with their 
history, and so on. As soon as the factor of interaction comes in, of course, 
it goes without saying that there will be other shared characteristics in 
addition to the interaction. This answer has the attraction of resolving the 
apparent conflict between the definitions of “speech community”, but leads 
inevitably to the conclusion that different speech communities intersect in 
complex ways with one another − for example, a community defined in 
terms of interaction may contain parts of several communities defined in 
terms of shared language varieties. It will be seen that this is in fact 
precisely the notion of “speech community” as defined in 6, so we may 
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take 6 as the most comprehensive view which subsumes all the others, and 
therefore makes them unnecessary. 
Hudson doubts whether the notion “speech community” is helpful at 
all giving the following reasons for rejecting this assumption: 
1. Mismatch between subjective and objective reality. According to 
definition 6, communities exist only to the extent that we are aware of 
them, so their reality is only subjective, not objective − and may be only 
very loosely based on objective reality. We all have hazy notions of the 
way people speak in distant places of which we have little direct experience 
− notions such as “Northerner” (or “Southerner”), “American” (or 
“British”), “Irish”, “Australian” and so on. No self-respecting dialectologist 
would recognise a dialect area called “Northern” (or “Southern”) English, 
but some lay people certainly think in such terms, so the least we can say is 
that if objective communities exist, they are different from the communities 
that we recognise subjectively. 
2. Evidence against community grammars. The assumption behind 
all the definitions except 6 is that members of the community are 
linguistically “the same” in some sense, either in their use of language or in 
what they know and think about language. Peter Trudgill considers this 
assumption, and rejects it on the grounds that people do not even know the 
linguistic details of other people who live in the same city, let alone people 
who live hundreds of miles away. No doubt we could illustrate the same 
point even for members of the same family, especially if differences 
between generations are taken into account. 
3.   Evidence for networks. A typical social network has a small 
cluster of people near the centre and a collection of others “hanging on” 
more or less closely, and perhaps hanging on to other neighbouring 
networks at the same time. A community, in the sense intended by all our 
definitions, has a boundary (even if a hazy one), but social networks have 
no boundaries, not even hazy ones. 
4.   Small size of the most important communities. The last problem 
with the general notion of “speech community” is that if we are looking for 
social groups that are clearly relevant to a person's language, by far the 
most important ones are also very small − their family, their friends, their 
neighbours, their colleagues at school or work, any clubs or local 
organizations they belong to. These are the most important sources of 
linguistic influence, especially on children, even in these days of mass 
communications, but they are far smaller than the “speech communities” 
that linguists have tended to invoke. 
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The conclusion would therefore seem to be that our sociolinguistic 
world is not organized in terms of objective “speech communities”, even 
though we may think subjectively in terms of communities or social types 
such as “Londoner” and “American”. This means that the search for a 
“true” definition of the speech community, or for the “true” boundaries 
around some assumed speech community, is just a wild goose chase. 
This discussion of speech communities has raised the fundamental 
question: “Where is language?” Is it “in” the community or “in” the 
individual? Language must be “in the individual” for various reasons − 
because each individual is unique, because individuals use language so as 
to locate themselves in a multidimensional social space, and etc. 
 
Unit 7.  Language and Dialect 
What does it mean to say that some variety is a language? This is 
first of all a question about popular usage: what do ordinary people mean 
when they say that some variety is a language? It is part of our culture to 
make a distinction between “languages” and “dialects” − in fact, we make 
two separate, distinctions using these terms, and we may draw conclusions 
from this fact about our culturally inherited view of language. We may 
contrast our culture in this respect with others where no such distinction is 
made. This was the case in England until the term dialect was borrowed in 
the Renaissance, as a learned word from Greek. In fact, we may see our 
distinction between “language” and “dialect” as due to the influence of 
Greek culture, since the distinction was developed in Greek because of the 
existence of a number of clearly distinct written varieties in use in Classical 
Greece, each associated with a different area and used for a different kind 
of literature. Thus the meanings of the Greek terms which were translated 
as “language” and “dialect” were in fact quite different from the meanings 
these words have in English now. Their equivalents in French are perhaps 
more similar, since the French word dialecte refers only to regional 
varieties which are written and have a literature, in contrast with regional 
varieties which are not written, which are called patois. The point of this 
discussion is to show that there is nothing absolute about the distinction 
which English happens to make between “languages” and “dialects” (and 
for readers familiar with some language other than English, this discussion 
will hardly have been necessary). 
What then is the difference, for English speakers, between a 
language and a dialect? There are two separate ways of distinguishing 
them, and this ambiguity is a source of great confusion. The reason for the 
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ambiguity, and the resulting confusion, is precisely the fact that dialect was 
borrowed from Greek, where the same ambiguity existed. On the one hand, 
there is a difference of size, because a language is larger than a dialect. 
That is, a variety called a language contains more items than one called a 
dialect. This is the sense in which we may refer to English as a language, 
containing the sum total of all the terms in all its dialects, with “Standard 
English” as one dialect among many others (Yorkshire English, Indian 
English, etc.). Hence the greater “size” of the language English. 
The other contrast between “language” and “dialect” is a question of 
prestige, a language having prestige which a dialect lacks. If we apply the 
terms in this sense. Standard English is not a dialect at all, but a language, 
whereas the varieties which are not used in formal writing are dialects. 
Whether some variety is called a language or a dialect depends on how 
much prestige one thinks it has, and for most people this is a clear-cut 
matter, which depends on whether it is used in formal writing. Accordingly, 
people in Britain habitually refer to languages which are unwritten (or 
which they think are unwritten) as dialects, or “mere dialects”, irrespective 
of whether there is a (proper) language to which they are related. (It would 
be nonsense to use “dialect” in this way intending its “size” sense, of 
course). 
It is probably fair to say that the only kind of variety which would 
count as a “proper language” (in the second sense of “language”) is a 
standard language. Standard languages are interesting in as much as they 
have a rather special relation to society − one which is quite abnormal 
when seen against the context of the tens (or hundreds?) of thousands of 
years during which language has been used. Whereas one thinks of normal 
language development as taking place in a rather haphazard way, largely 
below the threshold of consciousness of the speakers, standard languages 
are the result of a direct and deliberate intervention by society. This 
intervention, called “standardisation”, produces a standard language where 
before there were just “dialects” (in the second sense, i.e. non-standard 
varieties). 
The notion “standard language” is somewhat imprecise, but a typical 
standard language will have passed through the following processes: 
1.   Selection − somehow or other a particular variety must have 
been selected as the one to be developed into a standard language. It may 
be an existing variety, such as the one used in an important political or 
commercial centre, but it could be an amalgam of various varieties. The 
choice is a matter of great social and political importance, as the chosen 
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variety necessarily gains prestige and so the people who already speak it 
share in this prestige. However, in some cases the chosen variety has been 
one with no native speakers at all − for instance, Classical Hebrew in Israel 
and the two modern standards for Norwegian. 
2.   Codification − some agency such as an academy must have 
written dictionaries and grammar books to “fix” the variety, so that 
everyone agrees on what is correct. Once codification has taken place, it 
becomes necessary for any ambitious citizen to learn the correct forms and 
not to use in writing any “incorrect” forms that may exist in their native 
variety.                           
3.    Elaboration of function − it must be possible to use the selected 
variety in all the functions associated with central government and with 
writing: for example, in parliament and law courts, in bureaucratic, 
educational and scientific documents of all kinds and, of course, in various 
forms of literature. This may require extra linguistic items to be added to 
the variety, especially technical words, but it is also necessary to develop 
new conventions for using existing forms − how to formulate examination 
questions, how to write formal letters and so on. 
4.   Acceptance − the variety has to be accepted by the relevant 
population as the variety of the community − usually, in fact, as the 
national language. Once this has happened, the standard language serves as 
a strong unifying force for the state, as a symbol of its independence of 
other states (assuming that its standard is unique and not shared with 
others), and as a marker of its difference from other states. It is precisely 
this symbolic function that makes states go to some lengths to develop one. 
This analysis of the factors typically involved in standardisation has 
been quite widely accepted by sociolinguists. However, there is ample 
scope for debate and disagreement about the desirability of certain aspects 
of standardisation. For instance, it is not essential either that standardisation 
should involve matters of pronunciation as well as of writing, or that the 
standard language should be presented as the only “correct” variety (a point 
argued by many linguists and sociolinguists). 
When we turn to the distinction between language and dialect, based 
on size, the situation is very different, since everything becomes relative − 
for example, in comparison with one variety a chosen variety may be large, 
yet compared with another it may be small. The variety containing all the 
items used in (English-speaking) Britain looks large compared with, say, 
Standard English or Cockney, but only small compared with the variety 
which consists of all the items used in any of the “English-speaking” 
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countries. This being so, the claim that a particular variety is a language, in 
the “size” sense, amounts to very little. 
The obvious candidate for an extra criterion is that of mutual 
intelligibility. If the speakers of two varieties can understand each other, 
then the varieties concerned are instances of the same language; otherwise 
they are not. This is a widely used criterion, but it cannot be taken seriously 
because there are such serious problems in its application. 
1.   Even popular usage does not correspond consistently to this 
criterion, since varieties which we (as lay people) call different languages 
may be mutually intelligible (for example, the Scandinavian languages, 
excluding Finnish and Lapp) and varieties which we call instances of the 
same language may not (for example, the so-called “dialects” of Chinese). 
Popular usage tends to reflect the other definition of language, based on 
prestige, so that if two varieties are both standard languages, or are 
subordinate to different standards, they must be different languages, and 
conversely they must be the same language if they are both subordinate to 
the same standard. This explains the difference between our ideas on the 
varieties of Scandinavia and of China: each Scandinavian country has a 
separate standard language (indeed, as we have just seen, Norway has two), 
whereas the whole of China only has one. 
2.   Mutual intelligibility is a matter of degree, ranging from total 
intelligibility down to total unintelligibility. How high up this scale do two 
varieties need to be in order to count as members of the same language? 
This is clearly a question which is best avoided, rather than answered, since 
any answer must be arbitrary. 
3.   Varieties may be arranged in a dialect continuum, a chain of 
adjacent varieties in which each pair of adjacent varieties are mutually 
intelligible, but pairs taken from opposite ends of the chain are not. One 
such continuum is said to stretch from Amsterdam through Germany to 
Vienna, and another from Calais to the south of Italy. The criterion of 
mutual intelligibility is, however, based on a relationship between 
languages that is logically different from that of sameness of language, 
which it is supposed to illuminate. If A is the same language as B, and B is 
the same language as C, then A and C must also be the same language, and 
so on. “Sameness of language” is therefore a transitive relation, but “mutual 
intelligibility” is an intransitive one: if A and B are mutually intelligible, 
and B and C are mutually intelligible, C and A are not necessarily mutually 
intelligible. The problem is that an intransitive relation cannot be used to 
elucidate a transitive relation. 
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4. Mutual intelligibility is not really a relation between varieties, but 
between people, since it is they, and not the varieties, that understand one 
another. This being so, the degree of mutual intelligibility depends not just 
on the amount of overlap between the items in the two varieties, but on 
qualities of the people concerned. One highly relevant quality is 
motivation: how much does person A want to understand person B? This 
will depend on numerous factors such as how much A likes B, how far they 
wish to emphasize the cultural differences or similarities between them and 
so on. Motivation is important because understanding another person 
always requires effort on the part of the hearer − as witness the possibility 
of switching off when one's motivation is low. The greater the difference 
between the varieties concerned, the more effort is needed, so if A cannot 
understand B, this simply tells us that the task was too great for A's 
motivation, and we do not know what would have happened if their 
motivation had been higher. Another relevant quality of the hearer is 
experience: how much experience have they had of the variety to which 
they are listening? Obviously, the greater the previous experience, the 
greater the likelihood of understanding it. 
Both of these qualities raise another problem regarding the use of 
mutual intelligibility as a criterion, namely that it need not be reciprocal, 
since A and B need not have the same degree of motivation for 
understanding each other, nor need they have the same amount of previous 
experience of each other's varieties. Typically, it is easier for non-standard 
speakers to understand standard speakers than the other way round, partly 
because the former will have had more experience of the standard variety 
(notably through the media) than vice versa, and partly because they may 
be motivated to minimise the cultural differences between themselves and 
the standard speakers (though this is by no means necessarily so), while 
standard speakers may want to emphasise these differences. 
In conclusion, mutual intelligibility does not work as a criterion for 
delimiting languages in the “size” sense. There is no other criterion which 
is worth considering as an alternative, so we must conclude that there is no 
real distinction to be drawn between “language” and “dialect” (except 
with reference to prestige, where it would be better to use the term 
“standard (language)”, rather than just “language”). In other words, the 
search for language boundaries is a waste of time. Where the boundary 
between two languages is clear to sociolinguists, it is clear to everybody 
else as well − for example, there is no doubt that the languages spoken on 
opposite sides of the English Channel are different. And where a boundary 
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is unclear to ordinary people, it is equally unclear to sociolinguists. We 
can't assume that the phenomenon “language” always reaches us neatly 
packaged into “language-sized” bundles. All we can assume is that there 
are varieties of language, and that a given variety may be relatively similar 
to some other varieties and relatively different from others. 
 
Unit 8.  Regional Dialects and Isoglosses 
If we consider the most straightforward variety differences based on 
geography, it should be possible to identify what are called regional 
dialects within any larger variety such as English. Fortunately, there is a 
vast amount of evidence bearing on this question, produced by the 
discipline called dialectology, particularly by its branch called dialect 
geography. Since the nineteenth century, dialectologists in Europe and the 
United States (and, on a smaller scale, in Britain) have been studying the 
geographical distribution of linguistic items, such as pairs of synonymous 
words (for example, pail versus bucke), or different pronunciations of the 
same word, such as farm with or without the /r/. Their results are plotted on 
a map, showing which items were found in which villages (since dialect 
geography tends to concentrate on rural areas to avoid the complexities of 
towns). The dialect geographer may then draw a line between the area 
where one item was found and areas where others were found, showing a 
boundary for each area called an isogloss (from Greek iso- “same” and 
gloss- “tongue”). 
Isoglosses should never intersect, because if they did they would be 
dividing the same population in two contradictory ways (just as if we first 
split it according to sex and then according to age, which is impossible to 
show in a single tree). Unfortunately this prediction is wrong; in fact, it 
could hardly be further from reality, because cross-classification is the 
normal, most common relationship among isoglosses. To take just one 
example, there are two isoglosses in southern England which intersect. One 
isogloss separates the area (to the north) where come is pronounced with 
the same vowel as stood, from the area where it has the open vowel [A], as 
in Received Pronunciation (RP), the prestige accent of England. The other 
isogloss separates the area (to the north-east) where r of farm is not 
pronounced, from the area where it is. 
From such findings many dialectologists have drawn the conclusion 
that each item has its own distribution through the population of speakers, 
and that there is no reason to expect different items to have identical 
distributions. This seems to be the only reasonable conclusion to draw from 
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the data. But this leads to the further conclusion that isoglosses need not 
delimit varieties, except in the trivial sense where varieties each consist of 
just one item. 
 
Unit 9.  Registers 
The term REGISTER is widely used in sociolinguistics to refer to 
“varieties according to use”, in contrast with dialects, defined as “varieties 
according to user”. The distinction is needed because the same person may 
use very different linguistic items to express more or less the same meaning 
on different occasions, and the concept of “dialect” cannot reasonably be 
extended to include such variation. For instance, in writing one letter a 
person might start: “I am writing to inform you that...”, but in another the 
same person might write: “I just wanted to let you know that...”. Such 
examples could be multiplied endlessly, and suggest that the amount of 
variation due to register differences (if it could somehow be quantified) 
may be quite comparable with that due to differences in dialect. We can 
interpret register differences in terms of the model of acts of identity in 
much the same way as for dialect differences. Each time we speak or write 
we not only locate ourselves in relation to the rest of society, but we also 
relate our act of communication itself to a complex classificatory scheme of 
communicative behaviour. 
The “dimensions” on which an act of communication may be located 
are no less complex than those relevant to the social location of the speaker. 
Michael Halliday distinguishes three general types of dimension: field, 
mode and tenor. Field is concerned with the purpose and subject-matter 
of the communication; mode refers to the means by which communication 
takes place − notably, by speech or writing; and tenor depends on the 
relations between participants. Once again, a slogan may help: field refers 
to “why” and “about what” a communication takes place; mode is about 
“how”; and tenor is about “to whom” (i.e. how the speaker views the 
person addressed). In terms of this model, the two examples of letter-
openings cited above would differ in tenor, one being impersonal 
(addressed to someone with whom the writer only has formal relations) and 
the other personal, but their field and mode are the same. 
According to this model, register differences are at least three-
dimensional. Another widely used model has been proposed by Dell 
Hymes, in which no less than thirteen separate variables determine the 
linguistic items selected by a speaker, apart from the variable of “dialect”. 
It is very doubtful if even this number reflects all the complexities of 
 27 
register differences. Nevertheless, each of these models provides a 
framework within which any relevant dimensions of similarity and 
difference may be located. For example, the relations between speaker and 
“addressee” involve more than one such dimension including the 
dimension of “power”, on which the addressee is subordinate, equal or 
superior to the speaker, and the dimension called “solidarity”, which 
distinguishes relatively intimate relations from more distant ones. In 
English speakers locate themselves on these two dimensions in relation to 
addressees largely by choosing among the alternative ways of naming the 
addressee − Mr Smith, sir. John, mate and so on. 
It is easy to see that the selection of items within a given sentence 
reflects different factors, depending on which items are involved. One item 
may, for instance, reflect the formality of the occasion, while another 
reflects the expertise of the speaker and addressee. This is the case in a 
sentence like We obtained some sodium chloride, where obtained is a 
formal word (in contrast with got) and sodium chloride is a technical 
expression (in contrast with salt). The dimension of formality is totally 
independent of the dimension of technicality, so four combinations of 
formality with technicality can be illustrated by the following perfectly 
normal sentences: 
 
formal, technical We obtained some sodium chloride. 
formal, non-technical We obtained some salt. 
informal, technical We got some sodium chloride. 
informal, non-technical We got some salt. 
 
Simple examples like these suggest that different linguistic items are 
sensitive to different aspects of the act of communication, in the same way 
that different items react to different properties of the speaker. We can only 
speak of registers as varieties in the rather weak sense of sets of linguistic 
items which all have the same social distribution, i.e. all occur under the 
same circumstances. This is a far cry from the notion of variety in which 
speakers stick to one variety throughout a stretch of speech, speaking “one 
dialect” (perhaps the only one they can speak) and “one register”. However, 
it is also probably fair to say that those who use the term “register” have 
never really intended it to be taken in this sense, as witness the fact that all 
the models presented lay great stress on the need for multi-dimensional 
analysis of registers. 
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Another point of similarity between dialects and registers is that they 
overlap considerably − one person's dialect is another person's register. For 
example, the items which one person uses under all circumstances, 
however informal, may be used by someone else only on the most formal 
occasions. This is the relation between “native” speakers of standard and 
non-standard dialects. Forms which are part of the standard speaker's 
“dialect” are part of a special “register” for the non-standard speaker − a 
serious social inequality. 
 
Unit 10.  Diglossia 
Having emphasised the theoretical possibility of each individual 
linguistic item having its own unique social distribution among the various 
circumstances of use, it is now important to report in some societies there is 
a relatively simple arrangement called diglossia in which at least one type 
of social restriction on items can be expressed in terms of large-scale 
“varieties”, rather than item by item. The term diglossia was introduced 
into the English-language literature on sociolinguistics by Charles Ferguson 
in order to describe the situation found in places like Greece, the Arabic-
speaking world in general, German-speaking Switzerland and the island of 
Haiti − a list which can easily be extended. In all these societies there are 
two distinct varieties, sufficiently distinct for lay people to call them 
separate languages, of which one is used only on formal and public 
occasions while the other is used by everybody under normal, everyday 
circumstances. The two varieties are normally called “High” and “Low”, or 
“standard” and “vernacular”. Ferguson's definition of diglossia is as 
follows: Diglossia is a relatively stable language situation in which, in 
addition to the primary dialects of the language (which may include a 
standard or regional standards), there is a very divergent, highly codified 
(often grammatically more complex) superposed variety, the vehicle of a 
large and respected body of written literature, either of an earlier period or 
in another speech community, which is learned largely by formal education 
and is used for most written and formal spoken purposes but is not used by 
any sector of the community for ordinary conversation. 
For example, in an Arabic-speaking diglossic community, the 
language used at home is a local version of Arabic (there may be very great 
differences between one “dialect” of Arabic and another, to the point of 
mutual incomprehensibility), with little variation between the most 
educated and the least educated speakers. However, in a lecture at a 
university, or a sermon in a mosque, the only possibility is Standard 
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Arabic, a variety different at all levels from the local vernacular, and felt to 
be so different from the “Low” variety that it is taught in schools in the way 
that foreign languages are taught in English-speaking societies. Likewise, 
when children learn to read and write, it is the standard language, and not 
the local vernacular, which they are taught. 
Ferguson identifies three conditions in a speech community that lead 
to diglossia. The first is the existence of a large body of literature in a 
language that is similar to or the same as the indigenous language. This 
literature must embody some of the fundamental values of the community. 
Second, literacy in the community is usually restricted to a small elite. 
Third, a long period of time, even centuries, is involved in establishing the 
first and second conditions. 
The speakers of all the languages mentioned above regard H as 
superior to L in many respects. Attitudinally, some speakers are very 
strongly in favor of the H variety, so much so that they deny the existence 
of L by stating that speakers of the L variety are merely speaking the 
language incorrectly. This is true in the case of Arabic speakers. Educated 
Arabs deny using the L variety of Arabic, as do Haitian Creole speakers, 
who claim to use only French. Often, the speakers believe that the H variety 
is more logical, more beautiful, and better able to express important 
thoughts. Subsequent research shows that several other communities such 
as Tamil in South India exhibit diglossic characteristics.  
The most obvious difference between diglossic and English-speaking 
societies is that no one in the former has the advantage of learning the High 
variety (as used on formal occasions and in education) as their first 
language, since everyone speaks the Low variety at home. Consequently, 
the way to acquire a High variety in such a society is not by being born into 
the right kind of family, but by going to school. Of course, there are still 
differences between families in their ability to afford education, so 
diglossia does not guarantee linguistic equality between poor and rich, but 
the differences emerge only in formal public situations requiring the High 
variety. 
It will be noticed that the definition of “diglossia” given by Ferguson 
is quite specific on several points. For example, he requires that the High 
and Low varieties should belong to the same language, for example, 
Standard (or Classical) and Colloquial Arabic. However, some writers have 
extended the term to cover situations which do not strictly count as 
diglossic according to this definition. Joshua Fishman, for example, refers 
to Paraguay as an example of a diglossic community, although the High 
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and Low varieties are respectively Spanish and Guarani, an Indian language 
totally unrelated to Spanish. 
However, Fishman (following John Gumperz) also extends the term 
diglossia to include any society in which two or more varieties are used 
under distinct circumstances. Fishman has generalized the concept of 
diglossia to bilingual communities. He notes that a hierarchical evaluation 
of languages as high and low is found in bilingual communities as well. For 
example, in Zaire, French is reserved for prestige domains such as higher 
education, law, and administration and thus functions as a high language 
relative to Lingala and other indigenous languages which are used in less 
prestigious domains and thus function like low languages. This extension 
of diglossia to bilingual communities works in most cases, except that there 
are many communities in which the high language is also a mother tongue 
and not necessarily one that is learned only in school. Furthermore, 
diglossia is generally interpreted as implying a rather rigid complementarity 
or exclusivity of functions; that is, where one variety is appropriate, the 
other is never used. However in many bilingual or multilingual situations 
one encounters not only a complementarity of languages but also a type of 
use which is best described as overlapping or intermeshing. Also, in a 
bilingual (as opposed to the diglossic) situation, the codes in question may 
not be so sharply differentiated into high or low codes in terms of prestige. 
These differences mean that the application of diglossia to bilingualism 
cannot be precise. 
Recent empirical research on diglossia in Greece, the Arab world, 
and elsewhere suggests that the dichotomy may be giving way to 
intermediate varieties; that is, in contexts which were previously thought to 
be the exclusive domain of the high varieties, the use of less formal 
varieties which incorporate some elements of the low variety is seen. 
 
 
 
EXERCISES 
1. Discuss the following: 
1.   Speech communities and languages. 
2.   Language and dialect 
2.1.   What does it mean to say that some variety is a language? 
2.2.   What are the processes a typical standard language will have passed 
through? Explain each of them. 
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2.3.   What are the problems in application of mutual intelligibility criterion 
for distinction between language and dialect? 
2.4.   What criteria are to be employed for distinction between language and 
dialect? 
3.   Regional dialects and isoglosses. 
4.   Registers. 
5.1.   What are the dimensions on which an act of communication may be 
located. Characterize each of them. Give examples. 
5.2.   Is there any similarity between dialects and registers? Ground your 
answer. 
6.   Diglossia. 
 
2. Using your knowledge of diglossia, decide whether the blank spaces 
in this text should be filled  with H (for high variety) or L (for low 
variety). 
Haiti has been described as another diglossic situation by some 
linguists, with French as the … variety and Haitian Creole as the … 
variety. Attitudes towards the two codes in a diglossia situation are 
complicated. People generally admire the … variety even when they can't 
understand it. Attitudes to it are usually very respectful. It has prestige in 
the sense of high status. These attitudes are reinforced by the fact that the 
variety is the one which is described and 'fixed', or standardised, in 
grammar books and dictionaries. People generally do not think of the … 
variety as worth describing. However, attitudes to the … variety are varied 
and often ambivalent. In many part of Swiss Germany people are quite 
comfortable with the … variety and use it all the time − even to strangers. 
In other countries where the − variety is a language used in another country 
as a normal means of communication, and the … variety is used only 
locally, people may rate the − very low indeed. In Haiti, although both 
French and the Creole were declared national languages in the 1983 
constitution, many people still regard French, the … variety, as the only 
real language of the country. They ignore the existence of Haitian Creole, 
which in fact everyone uses at home and with friends for all their everyday 
interactions. On the other hand, even here the … variety is highly valued by 
some speakers. So while its very existence is denied by some, other may 
regard the … variety as the best way of expressing their real feelings. 
 
3. Using the information provided in the previous pages, summarise 
what you now know about the differences between H and L indiglossic 
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communities. You are advised to discuss the following questions with 
your neighbours and keep a record of your answers on paper. 
a) How are they linguistically related? Are they distinct languages or 
varieties of the same language? 
b)   How are they used in the community? 
c) Which is used for conversation with family and friends? 
d)   How is each variety learned? 
e)    Which has most prestige? 
f)   Which is codified in grammar books and dictionaries? 
g)  In which variety is literature usually written? 
 
4. Using your knowledge of the process of standardisation of varieties, 
find the second half of each of these sentences. Choose the correct 
variant from a, b, c or d. 
1. The process starts when a 
need arises for a common, 
stable variety in a speech 
community, so… 
a. ...this means that grammar and 
dictionaries are produced.  
 
2. This norm is usually 
codified  
 
b. ...its range of functions is 
elaborated and extended.  
 
3. In order that the variety 
can cope in a wide range of 
domains...  
 
c. ...the variety acquires clear 
acceptance as a standard throughout 
the speech community.  
 
4. Finally, full 
standardisation is achieved 
when...  
 
d. ...a norm is chosen, usually based 
on social, political or economic factor. 
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Chapter 2. SPEECH AS SOCIAL INTERACTION 
Unit 1. The Social Nature of Speech  
One point of contact between language and thought is its use by an older 
generation to transmit its culture to a younger one. In other words, speech is an 
instrument of socialisation − the process by which children are turned into 
fully competent members of their society. However a good deal of culture is 
transmitted verbally, and it is often said the development of the faculty of 
language by the human species made it possible for “biological evolution”, 
working on genes, to be replaced as the dominant factor in our development by 
“cultural evolution”, working on our minds. There is no need to labour the point 
that speech is a crucial component in the process of socialisation. 
It is obvious that language allows our socialisers to teach us facts (for 
example, “Beethoven was a composer”; “Germs make us ill”), and to name 
our concepts. The question is whether language can be said to build these 
concepts in the first place, or whether it reflects concepts which would have 
been there in any case. The answer seems to be “A bit of each”. 
We can be sure that some concepts are independent of language. Some 
we learned as babies before we started to speak towards the end of the first 
year of life, and others were formed later, but must have developed without 
recourse to language since we still have no words for them in our adult vo-
cabulary. For instance, we have a concept for the kinds of things we buy at a 
newsagent (or a tobacconist, or a do-it-yourself shop), but no name for any of 
these concepts, in contrast with concepts for things bought in other kinds of 
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shop, for example, groceries. Whether or not there is a name for these con-
cepts seems to have little to do with our ability to learn them. Similarly, we 
can see the similarities among nails, screws, rivets, nuts and bolts − they have 
similar functions, they are all made of metal and we might expect people to 
store them together − but there is no name for this concept. Examples like 
this are easy to multiply, and warn us against the danger of assuming that 
concepts only exist when there is specific linguistic evidence for them. 
On the other hand, we can be equally sure that there are other concepts 
which we should not have if it were not for language. The most obvious 
cases are those which relate to language as a phenomenon − the 
concepts “language”, “meaning”, “word” and so on. However, there are 
other concepts which we learn after we have learned their names, and for 
which the name is our main evidence. For instance, a mother said to her 
five-year-old child, “We have to keep the screen door closed, honey, so 
the flies won't come in. Flies bring germs into the house with them”. 
When the child was asked afterwards what germs were, the answer was 
“Something the flies play with”. This example illustrates nicely the way 
in which a new word may act as evidence that an unknown concept 
exists, leaving the learner with the problem of somehow working out 
what that concept is, making use of any evidence that may be available. 
Moreover, we learn many concepts by being told about them, especially 
during our formal education, so we do in fact learn them through language, 
whether or not we could have learned them without it. If it were not for 
language we should probably not have concepts to which we could attach 
words like peninsula, feudal, metabolism, classical or factor. 
Language seems to be more important in learning some concepts than 
others, and one general principle may be that language becomes more impor-
tant as the concepts concerned get further from one's immediate sensory 
experience − in other words, more abstract (as in the germs example). An-
other principle may be that the influence of language is more important where 
there are alternative ways of interpreting experience (as in the choice be-
tween East/West and left/right). If we combine this conclusion with semantic 
relativity, we have evidence that language does influence thought: the con-
cepts that people learn through language may be different according to the 
language through which they learn them. 
It is hardly necessary to stress the general importance of speech in social 
life. Speech allows us to communicate with each other at a much more 
sophisticated level than would otherwise be possible, and since 
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communication is a social activity it could be said that speech is also social. 
We have to leam social constraints on speech over and above those which 
are part of our language. 
It is clear that there are many such constraints, which may differ from 
society to society. For example, in Britain we are required to respond when 
someone else greets us; when we refer to someone, we are required to take 
account of what the addressee already knows about them; when we 
address a person, we must choose our words carefully, to show the social 
relations between us; when someone else is talking we are required to keep 
more or less silent (but not totally so). However, the same is not necessarily 
true in all societies so the constraints are learned through socialization. 
Another thing which will become apparent is that the distinction between 
“language” and “social constraints on speech” is anything but clear, since many 
of the constraints discussed below refer to specific linguistic items, or more or 
less large classes of items, and could therefore be treated as part of language 
along with what we know about meanings. This is not surprising, since many 
items have meanings which refer specifically to aspects of the speech-events 
in which they are used − notably all the items with deictic meanings, referring to 
the speaker (I, we), the addressee (you), the time of speaking (present/past 
tense, today, etc.) and the place of speaking (here, etc.). Moreover, many items 
are restricted in their use to certain social circumstances (for example, get 
versus obtain), and we took it for granted that such information was part of our 
language. Consequently, it would be natural to make the same assumption about 
the information that the French word tu “you” is to be used only to intimates 
(and small children and animals). And having made that decision, it is only a 
small step to including in “language” similar information about whole classes 
of items, such as the class of first names in English, which are also to be used 
only to intimates (in contrast with names like Mr Brown). 
It is easy to see how “language” and “social constraints on speech” merge, 
and it will also be clear from several points in the discussion below that social 
constraints on speech can apply not just to speech but to social behaviour in 
general. The accepted term for aspects of behaviour through which people 
influence and react to each other is social interaction, and speech is only one 
aspect of such behaviour, closely meshed with other aspects. One of the 
leading investigators in this field, Michael Argyle (a social psychologist), has 
described the field as follows: One achievement of recent research has been 
to establish the basic elements of which social interaction consists; 
current research is concerned with finding out precisely how these 
elements function. It is now agreed that the list consists of various 
 36 
signals: verbal and nonverbal, tactile, visible and audible − various 
kinds of bodily contact, proximity, orientation, bodily posture, physical 
appearance, facial expression, movement of head and hands, direction of 
gaze, timing of speech, emotional tone of speech, speech errors, type of 
utterance and linguistic structure of utterance. Each of these elements 
can be further analysed and divided into categories or dimensions; each 
plays a distinctive role in social interaction, though they are closely 
interconnected. 
The study of speech as part of social interaction has involved many 
different disciplines, including social psychology, sociology, anthropology, 
ethology (the study of behaviour in animals), philosophy, artificial intelli-
gence (the study of human intelligence via computer simulation), sociolin-
guistics and linguistics. Each discipline brings a different range of questions 
and methods to bear on the study, and all can learn a lot from the others. 
The main methods used in the study are introspection and participant obser-
vation, with a certain amount of experimentation (by social psychologists 
and ethologists) and computer simulation (by artificial intelligence work-
ers). One of the most important contributions has been made by anthropol-
ogists who engage in what is called the ethnography of speaking or the 
ethnography of communication, a field dominated by the work of Dell 
Hymes. The importance of this work has been to provide data on societies 
other than the advanced western ones in which most linguists live, and to 
make it clear how much variety there is in the social constraints on speech. 
Unit 2.  The Classification of Speech 
Speech plays many different roles in social interaction. In its primitive 
uses, language functions as a link in concerted human activity, as a piece of 
human behaviour. It is a mode of action and not an instrument of reflection. 
An example of this would be the kind of speech used by people shifting furni-
ture: To you ... now up a bit ... and so on, where the speech acts as a control 
on people's physical activity, in contrast to its function in a lecture where it is 
intended to influence the thoughts rather than the actions of the listeners. 
Another use of speech is simply to establish or reinforce social relations − 
what so called phatic communion, the kind of chit-chat that people engage in 
simply in order to show that they recognize each other's presence. We might 
add many other uses of speech to this list − speech to obtain information 
(Where's the tea-pot?), for expressing emotions (What a lovely hat!), for its 
own sake (She sells sea-shells by the sea-shore) and so on.  
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One particular approach to the functional classification of speech certainly 
ought to be mentioned as it has been extremely influential. This is the 
approach based on speech-acts, which has been developed in the main by 
philosophers and linguists following the British philosopher J. L. Austin. 
Austin argued that the study of meaning should not concentrate on bald 
statements such as Snow is white, taken out of context, since language is 
typically used, in speech, for many other functions − when we speak we 
make suggestions, promises, invitations, requests, prohibitions and so on. 
Indeed, in some cases we use speech to perform an action, in the extreme 
sense the speech is itself the action which it reports − for instance, / name 
this ship “Saucy Sue” has to be said if the naming is to be accomplished. 
Such bits of speech are called performative utterances. It can be seen that an 
account of all these different functions of speech must be formulated in 
terms of a general theory of social activity. 
One of the achievements of work on speech acts has been to draw attention 
to the extensive vocabulary that ordinary English provides for talking about 
utterances - verbs like say, promise and persuade. The following examples are 
just a small selection of the available terms in English: 
 
Table 2 – Range of Utterances 
general speaking, talking 
manner saying, shouting, whispering 
flow of information saying, shouting, whispering 
agreeing, announcing, asking, 
discussing, explaining, ordering 
source acting, reading, reciting, mimicking 
speaker  evaluation apologising, boasting, complaining,  
criticising, grumbling, joking,        
thanking 
hearer evaluation flattering, promising, teasing, threatening, 
warning 
effect on hearer cajoling, dissuading, persuading 
 
What these examples show is, firstly, that the classification of speech-acts is 
of great interest and importance to English speakers, and secondly that there is 
no single basis for classification. We can classify on the basis of: manner of 
speaking (for example, whispering versus shouting), how information flows 
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between speaker and hearer (for example, asking versus telling), where the 
words originate from (acting, reciting versus spontaneous speech), how the 
speaker evaluates the content (for example, apologizing versus boasting), how 
the hearer evaluates it (for example, promising versus threatening), and the 
effect it has on the hearer, i.e. its “perlocutionary force” (for example, persuad-
ing and dissuading). We can even combine two or three of these bases; for 
example, preaching and lecturing are defined both by their manner and by the 
flow of information. Even the length of units classified − our “speech-acts” − 
varies vastly, from these complex categories like preaching and lecturing, which 
apply to long stretches of speech, to the manner-based categories (for example, 
whispering) which can apply just to single words. Some of these bases for 
classification appear to be much more important than others. For example, we 
have very few words specifically for describing the effects of speech-acts, as 
opposed to words like depress, annoy and so on which can be applied to the 
emotional effect of any kind of event, and not just to those of speech-acts. 
If speech-act categories are cultural concepts we might expect them to 
vary from one society to another, and that is what we do find, speech-acts 
are very varied. This variation is socially very important − it is vital to know 
whether the speaker is joking or serious, telling us a fact or asking for infor-
mation and so on; − so it is not surprising to find a rich set of categories that 
can be described in words. It is not just sociolinguists who like to talk about 
talking, and it is interesting to compare the classificatory systems that differ-
ent languages recognise. Some of the categories have been studied by philos-
ophers as “illocutionary forces” and “perlocutionary forces”, but the catego-
ries that fall under these terms are only a small selection of the total range 
and may not have any special claim to being fundamental; nor can we be sure 
that the categories which our language recognises are the only important 
ones for us as students of speech behaviour. All we can be sure of is that 
people's behaviour varies according to what kind of speech-act they consider 
themselves to be performing, and that some of this variation is systematic. 
Unit 3.  Speech as Skilled Work 
Speech is not an automatic reflex like sneezing or a spontaneous expres-
sion of emotion like laughing; it is skilled work. It is work, since it requires 
effort, and its degree of success depends on the effort that is made. It is 
skilled in that it requires the “know-how” type of knowledge, which is applied 
more or less successfully according to how much practice one has had (and 
according to other factors such as intelligence). Putting these two 
 39 
characteristics together, we can predict that speech may be more successful 
at some times than at others, and some people may be better at it than others. 
There is no doubt that this is the case: we all know that sometimes we get 
“tongue-tied” or “drop a brick”, and that some people are more likely than 
others to be stuck for “the right thing to say”. 
If speech is skilled work, the same is true of other aspects of social inter-
action in face-to-face communication or focussed interaction: “it is fruitful 
to look upon the behaviour of people engaged in focussed interaction as an 
organised, skilled performance, analogous to skills such as car driving”. Just 
as some people are better drivers than others (to the extent that some pass 
the driving test and others fail), so some people are better at social interaction 
than others. However, there are two major caveats. Firstly, success in speech 
varies considerably according to the type of speech-act required. Some peo-
ple are good at intellectual debate and poor at phatic communion, and vice 
versa; children who are highly skilled in verbal games may flounder in the 
classroom or in a formal interview. Secondly, it is not obvious how success 
should be measured, except against the intentions of the speaker. For in-
stance, if a chatterbox is with a person who habitually stays silent while oth-
ers do the talking, each may consider themselves more successful than the 
other, according to how they balance the need to fill “awkward” gaps against 
the need to avoid triviality. The same two caveats apply equally, of course, to 
other aspects of social interaction. 
This is not the place to try to specify the particular kinds of skill needed for 
successful speech, since they presumably include all the general skills needed 
for social interaction plus all the specifically linguistic skills concerned with 
the use of linguistic items. They vary from very specific skills, dealing with 
particular linguistic items (e.g. when to say sir) or with particular situations 
(for exampie, how to conduct a business transaction on an expensive 
transatlantic telephone call), to much more general skills, such as how to 
avoid ambiguity. We may perhaps think of these skills arranged hierarchically, 
with the most specific ones at the bottom and the most general at the top, and 
assume that in dealing with a particular situation the speaker will look for a 
specific skill in preference to a more general one, since the latter will always 
involve more cognitive effort and may be less successful. For instance, in 
asking for a ticket on a bus, it is easier and safer to use what you know about 
buying bus-tickets, or buying transport tickets in general, than to use a more 
general rule for requesting anything from anybody (for example, by saying 
Excuse me, would you mind selling me a ticket to ...). We may guess that one 
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of the reasons why some people perform particularly well in some situations 
is that they have learned very specific skills for use in those situations. 
Speech is socially classified in terms of types of speech-act, and these speech-
act types are learned as part of our socialisation. For example, we learn how to 
order a meal in a restaurant by watching other people doing it, in much the same 
way that we learn vocabulary and grammatical constructions. The clearest 
evidence for this learning is that rules and skills vary from society to society. 
Speech, then, is an acquired skill; but it is also work. Talking takes energy, 
both physical and mental, and can leave us feeling tired. Sometimes we are 
too tired to engage in it. The same is true, of course, of all social interaction, 
which raises an important question: why are we willing to do it? And why are 
we willing to accept the restrictions placed on us by our society's social rules? 
It is easy to see why we bother to say things that help us to get things that we 
want, but why do we bother with phatic communion and why do we worry 
about how we dress up our requests in speech? The question of motivation is 
one of the basic questions of social psychology and sociology, so we cannot 
expect a simple answer, but a particularly influential (and attractive) theory is 
based on the term face, which is used in much the same way as in the expres-
sions to lose face and to save face, meaning something like “self-respect” or 
“dignity”. The theory was developed by Erving Goffman, an American soci-
ologist (1969), who called the work needed to maintain face face-work. 
The basic idea of the theory is this: we lead unavoidably social lives, since 
we depend on each other, but as far as possible we try to lead our lives without 
losing our own face. However, our face is a very fragile thing which other 
people can very easily damage, so we lead our social lives according to the 
Golden Rule (Do to others as you would like them to do to you!) by looking 
after other people's faces in the hope that they will look after ours. The princi-
ple is described as follows in a standard sociology text-book: Much of what we 
usually call “politeness” or “etiquette” in social gatherings consists of 
disregarding aspects of behaviour that might otherwise lead to a “loss of 
face”. Episodes in an individual s past, or personal characteristics that 
might produce embarrassment if mentioned, are not commented on or re-
ferred to ... Tact is a sort of protective device which each party involved 
employs in the expectation that, in return, their own weaknesses will not 
be deliberately exposed to general view. 
Face is something that other people give to us, which is why we have to be 
so careful to give it to them (unless we consciously choose to insult them, 
which is exceptional behaviour). 
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For sociolinguists the most relevant discussion of face is by Brown and 
Levinson, who distinguish two kinds efface. They call them positive and 
negative, but these terms can be misleading because both kinds of face 
are valuable; instead, Hudson calls them solidarity-face and power-face, to 
show the close link to the important concepts of power and solidarity. Both 
kinds could be described as respect, but this word has a different sense in 
each case. Solidarity-face is respect as in / respect you for ..., i.e. the 
appreciation and approval that others show for the kind of person we are, for 
our behaviour, for our values and so on. If something threatens our 
solidarity-face we feel embarrassment or shame. Power-face is respect as in 
respect your right to..., which is a “negative” agreement not to interfere. 
This is the basis for most formal politeness, such as standing back to let 
someone else pass. When our power-face is threatened we feel offended. 
Each kind efface is the basis for a different kind of politeness (a term which 
now has a rather more general sense than the ordinary one which contrasts 
it with rudeness). Solidarity-politeness shows respect for the person, 
whereas power-politeness respects their rights. 
It is interesting to see how much of language is geared to looking after the 
two kinds of politeness, and we shall consider some of these ways in more 
detail below. For solidarity-politeness we have a wide range of ways of showing 
intimacy and affection - words used for addressing the other person (for 
example, mate, love, darling, not to mention greetings like Hi!) and others 
used to show solidarity-politeness towards the person referred to (for exam-
ple, William or even Bill as opposed to Mr Brown). For showing power-
politeness there are different “address” words (for example, sir, please), and 
all the euphemisms that protect the other person from being offended (for 
example, spend a penny, pass away). 
The theory of face is part of a larger theory of social interaction, in which 
speech is only one component. This theory starts by distinguishing unfocussed 
and focussed interaction, according to whether or not the people concerned 
consider themselves to be “together” in more than a purely physical sense. 
Most interactions in modern cities are unfocussed, with strangers passing in 
the street or sitting next to each other on buses. The main consideration in 
these cases is to preserve each other's power-face. One obvious example is 
that we try to keep out of each other's way, but another is that we avoid eye-
contact. Unfocussed interaction is a recent creation of modern social pat-
terns for which our genes have presumably given us little preparation. 
In contrast, focussed interaction has been the basis for social groups since 
the earliest times. It is focussed interaction that provides most of our face 
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even in modern societies, so it also provides most of the serious threats to 
face. This is where solidarity-face becomes so important because we care 
about what our friends and family think of us; and power-face can be threat-
ened in many ways (not least by parents imposing restrictions on children). 
One reason why we avoid eye-contact in unfocussed interaction is probably 
that it is so important as a way of negotiating our way through focussed 
interactions. Humans have a rich “vocabulary” for non-verbal communica-
tion − smiles, frowns, winks, nods, gestures and body-movements − most of 
which are shared not only by all human societies but also by some primates. 
It seems likely, therefore, that some of the skills needed for face-work are 
innate, as is our general need to maintain face. 
We need to save our own face by saving the face of everyone we talk to, 
so we need to manage our behaviour, both verbal and non-verbal, very care-
fully. This does not mean that speech will be the same the world over, even if 
we ignore differences of vocabulary and grammar. Each society recognizes 
its own norms for saving face, so our face-work consists in recogniing these 
norms and applying them effectively. 
Unit 4. The Norms Governing Speech 
Skill in speaking depends on a variety of factors, including a knowledge of 
the relevant rules governing speech. Such rules are of various types, dealing 
with different aspects of speech, but all we can do here is to mention a few 
examples. The rules chosen vary from one society to another, which makes it 
easier to see that there are rules, but this should not be taken to imply that all 
rules are similarly variable. (It is possible that there are widespread, if not 
universal rules, though the emphasis in the literature is on differences rather 
than similarities between cultures.) We shall call such roles norms because 
they define normal behaviour for the society concerned, without specific pen-
alties against those who do not follow them. 
First, there are norms governing the sheer quantity of speech that people 
produce, varying from very little to very much. Dell Hymes describes a soci-
ety where very little speech is the norm. 
Peter Gardener did some fieldwork in southern India, among a tribal 
people called the Puliya, describing their socialization patterns. There is no 
agriculture and no industry, and the society is neither particularly cooperative 
nor particularly competitive; so children are led neither to be particularly 
interdependent nor to be aggressively competitive with each other, but simply 
to busy themselves with their own concerns in reasonable spatial proximity. 
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He observed that, by the time a man was forty, he practically stopped speak-
ing altogether. He had no reason to speak. People there, in fact, just didn't 
talk much and seldom seemed to find anything much to talk about, and he saw 
this as a consequence of the particular kind of socialization pattern. 
We may contrast this society with one in Roti, a small island in eastern 
Indonesia, described by James Fox: For a Rotinese the pleasure of life is 
talk − not simply an idle chatter that passes time, but the more formal taking 
of sides in endless dispute, argument and repartee or the rivalling of one 
another in eloquent and balanced phrases on ceremonial occasions ... 
Lack of talk is an indication of distress. Rotinese repeatedly explain that if 
their “hearts  are confused or dejected, they keep silent. Contrarily, to be 
involved with someone requires active verbal encounter. 
According to Besnier much the same is true of typical Jewish east-coast 
Americans. There may be problems when people from societies with 
different norms meet, as shown by the following anecdote quoted by Coulth-
ard, where other instances of different norms relating to quantity of speech 
may also be found: An enthnographer describes staying with in-laws in 
Denmark and being joined by an American friend who, despite warnings, 
insisted on talking with American intensity until “at 9 o'clock my in-laws 
retired to bed; they just couldn't stand it any more”.  
Another kind of norm controls the number of people who talk at once in a 
conversation. Most readers would probably accept the principle that only one 
person should speak (otherwise there must be more than one conversation 
taking place, as at a party), but apparently this norm is not universal. The prac-
tices in a village in Antigua, in the West Indies, are described by Karl Reisman: 
Antiguan conventions appear, on the surface, almost anarchic. 
Fundamentally, there is no regular requirement for two or more voices not 
to be going at the same time. The start of a new voice is not in itself a 
signal for the voice speaking either to stop or to institute a process which 
will decide who is to have the floor. When someone enters a casual group, 
for example, no opening is necessarily made for him; nor is there any 
pause or other formal signal that he is being included. No one appears to 
pay any attention. When he feels ready he will simply begin speaking. He 
may be heard, he may not. That is, the other voices may eventually stop 
and listen, or some of them may; eyes may or may not turn to him. If he is 
not heard the first time he will try again, and yet again (often with the 
same remark). Eventually he will be heard or give up. 
Similarly, most readers would accept that there must be a limit on the 
number of interruptions permissible in a conversation; not so in Antigua: In a 
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brief conversation with me, about three minutes, a girl called to someone on 
the street, made a remark to a small boy, sang a little, told a child to go to 
school, sang some more, told a child to go buy bread, etc., all the while con-
tinuing the thread of her conversation about her sister. 
Other norms refer to the information which participants in a conversation 
give each other. If our only concern is to communicate as efficiently as pos-
sible, then information should flow freely. This may be the pattern in some 
societies, as suggested by some theories of pragmatics, but we cannot take 
it for granted. After all, information is an important commodity, and new 
information is particularly valuable as the substance of interesting 
conversations and a source of status for those who give it away. Those who 
have information that others don't know are in a powerful position, and may 
decide to ration the flow in a way that contradicts our more rational 
expectations. In familiar societies this is an individual matter (and we 
probably all know individuals who enjoy making others work hard for their 
information); but in some societies the process is institutionalised. For 
example, gossips on Nukulaelae Atoll frequently withhold important pieces 
of information, such as the identity of a person, from their gossip narratives, 
thus manipulating their audiences into asking for the missing information, 
sometimes over the space of several turns, as information is revealed in 
small doses, requiring further questioning. 
Similarly, according to Elinor Keenan, in at least one part of Madagascar 
the norm is waived under many circumstances. For instance, it would be 
quite normal to refer to one's own sister as “a girl” (Keenan quotes a specific 
occasion when a boy said to her − in Malagasy − “There is a girl who is 
coming”, referring to his own sister). Or again, if A asks A “Where is your 
mother?” and A responds “She is either in the house or at the market”, B's 
utterance is not usually taken to imply that A is unable to provide more specific 
information needed by the hearer. The implicature is not made, because the 
expectation that speakers will satisfy informational needs is not a basic norm. 
There are a number of reasons why speakers are so uninformative in this 
community. One is that they are afraid that identifying an individual may bring 
the person to the attention of evil forces, or get them into trouble in other 
ways. Another reason is the shortage of news in small isolated villages. Con-
sequently, there is no reluctance to give information when it is easily available 
to anyone − for instance, if there is a pot of rice cooking over a fire, people 
will refer to it as "the rice" since anyone can see that there is rice there. 
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Clearly, different norms for speech in different societies can often be ex-
plained by reference to other aspects of their cultures and cannot, therefore, 
be satisfactorily studied in isolation. 
Finally, there are very specific norms which may vary from society to society, 
such as the way one answers the telephone. To take another example, in Germa-
ny the hostess at a formal dinner party would probably say to her guests Ich darf 
jetzt bitten, Platz zu nehmen (I may now ask (you) to take (your) places), using 
a declarative construction, in contrast with the interrogative that might be used by 
an English hostess: May I ask you to come and sit down now? 
The diversity in the norms for speech are matched in the area of non-
verbal communication. For example, a raised eyebrow may mean various 
things according to the culture and social circumstances: greeting, invitation 
warning, scepticism, disdain, doubt, interest, intrigue or disgust. Conversely, 
different actions can have the same meaning in different communities. It has 
even been claimed that people brought up in the southern states smile differ-
ently from other Americans! On the other hand, behind all this diversity there 
appear to be some features that are universal, such as the obvious indications 
of “up” and “down”. As noted earlier, we may share some of these features 
with our primate relatives, in which case the explanation for the similarities is 
presumably genetic; so non-verbal communication offers the same range of 
learned and innate patterns as we seem to find in language. 
 
Unit 5.  Cultural Differences in Discourse 
Sociolinguists have documented the presence of dialects in every lan-
guage. These dialects, all of which are legitimate, are associated with edu-
cational, economic, social and historical conditions. To linguists, the word 
“dialect” refers to a way of speaking a language, and not to an incorrect 
way of speaking a language. 
While all dialects of a given language are linguistically legitimate, some 
achieve social prestige. In literate, economically developed societies, the dia-
lect spoken by those with the most formal education, the highest socioeco-
nomic status and the greatest degree of political power tends to acquire the 
greatest social prestige. Typically, it becomes the standard for the culture, for 
writing and for education. 
Standard dialects also provide a medium through which persons from dif-
ferent linguistic backgrounds can communicate with one another. Social and 
regional variations may exist within standard dialects as long as they conform 
to specified linguistic rules, largely grammatical in nature. Standard English, 
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therefore, should not be considered "Northern English' or "White English," 
since it is spoken, in one form or another, in all parts of the United States and 
by some members of all racial and cultural groups. 
At the other end of the social spectrum, so called nonstandard dialects are 
generally spoken by the “have nots”:  the powerless, the less educated, the 
less economically well off and the less socially prominent. While legitimate 
linguistically, these dialects tend to be unacceptable to the “haves” of society 
In American English, nonstandard dialects exist within all racial, ethnic and 
regional groups (see Table 2). Each dialect is a product of distinct social, 
historical, cultural and educational factors. All are legitimate in that they rep-
resent the concepts, needs and intentions of their speakers. 
 
Table 3 −  Some Varieties of Nonstandard American English 
Appalachian English 
“He just kept a begging and a crying and a wanting to go 
out”. (He persisted in begging, crying and wanting to leave) 
Athabascan English (Alaska,) 
“Most time we play games”. (Most of the time we play games) 
African American English Vernacular 
“He be scared, but I be brave”.  (He is usually scared, but I am usually 
brave) 
General American Nonstandard English 
“don't nobody want none”." (Nobody wants any) 
Keaukaha English (Hawaii) 
“/ no can place that name”. (I cannot place that name) 
New York City Nonstandard English 
“She 's a good cook, your mother”. (Your mother is a good cook) 
Southern American Nonstandard English 
“I mon ' rest”. (I am going to rest) 
Spanish Influenced English 
“Carol left yesterday. I think is coming back tomorrows”.  
(Carol left yesterday. I think she is coming back tomorrow) 
For a variety of reasons, including negative public attitudes and inade-
quate teaching models, nonstandard English speakers often do not effectively 
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learn standard English in school. Without competence in standard English, 
students will fail academically and face diminished career, social and life op-
tions. Many students who do learn standard English do so at a great price: 
devaluation or rejection of their home or community dialect. When 
competence in standard English is coupled with rejection of one's own 
home or community dialect, it may lead to serious psychological and identity 
problems. 
In the United States, the schools' failure to teach standard English is re-
flected in the poor performance of nonstandard English speakers on achieve-
ment, aptitude and diagnostic tests. Perhaps the most alarming evidence of 
this failure is the low performance of nonstandard English speakers on tests 
used to place students in remedial or gifted programs. Virtually all of these 
tests presume competence in standard English. 
Many African American children, usually from working class homes or 
communities, speak a nonstandard variety of English. This variety, often re-
ferred to as Black English Vernacular, is thought by many sociolinguists to 
reflect African influences on American English, and is reinforced by social 
isolation, segregation and group identity. 
In addition to differences in pronunciation, vocabulary and grammatical struc-
tures among cultural groups, variations also exist in the rules for general dis-
course in oral communication, covering such specific acts as narratives and 
conversation. In communicating with one another, teachers and students natu-
rally will follow the assumptions and rules governing discourse within their re-
spective cultures. Discourse rules govern such aspects of communication as: 
- opening or closing conversations; 
- taking turns during conversations; 
- interrupting; 
- using silence as a communicative device; 
- knowing appropriate topics of conversation; 
- interjecting humor at appropriate times; 
- using nonverbal behavior; 
- expressing laughter as a communicative device; 
- knowing the appropriate amount of speech to be used by participants;  
- sequencing of elements during discourse. 
Based on a review of literature and anecdotal reports, Taylor has listed 
verbal and nonverbal communication styles of working class African 
Americans as they contrast with those of Anglo Americans and middle class 
persons of other ethnic groups. Some of these characteristics are presented 
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in Table 3. Similar comparisons may be made between other cultural groups 
in the "typical" American classroom. 
 
Table 4 − Examples of Verbal and Nonverbal Communication 
Contrasts Among Some African Americans and Some Anglo 
Americans 
 
Some African Americans  Some Anglo Americans  
Hats and sunglasses may be 
considered by men as adornments 
much like jewelry and may be worn 
indoors  
Hats and sunglasses are considered 
utilitarian by men and as outwear 
to be removed indoors  
Touching another's hair is 
generally considered offensive  
Touching another's hair is a sign 
of affection.  
Asking personal questions of a 
person met for the first time may be 
seen as improper and intrusive  
Inquiring about jobs, family and so 
forth of someone one has met for the 
first time is seen as friendly 
Use of direct questions is sometimes 
considered harassment; e.g., asking 
when something will be finished is 
like rushing that person to finish  
Use of direct questions for 
personal information is 
permissible  
“Breaking in” during conversation 
by participants is usually tolerated. 
Competition for the floor is granted 
to the person who is most assertive  
Rules on taking turns in 
conversation dictate that one 
person has the floor at a time until 
all of his or her points are made  
Conversations are regarded as 
private between the recognized 
participants; “butting in” may be 
seen as eavesdropping and not 
tolerated  
Adding points of information or 
insights to a conversation in which 
one is not engaged is sometimes 
seen as helpful.  
The term “you people” is typically 
seen as pejorative and racist  
The term “you people” is 
tolerated.  
Listeners are expected to avert 
eyes to indicate respect and 
attention  
Listeners are expected to look at a 
speaker directly to indicate respect 
and attention  
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Speakers are expected to look at 
listeners directly in the eye 
 
Speakers are expected to avert 
eyes, especially in informal 
speaking situations 
Confederate flags and Black lawn 
ornaments are considered offensive 
and racist 
 
Symbols of the Old South, such 
as confederate flags and Black 
lawn ornaments, are considered 
acceptable by many 
Purposely including a minority 
person in group activities is seen as 
tokenism 
 
Including a minority person in group 
activities is seen as democratic 
 
Adoption of dance patterns or music 
of another cultural group is suspect 
or considered offensive 
 
Adoption of dance patterns or 
music of another cultural group 
is seen as a free and desirable 
exchange      
 Talking “Black” by outsiders 
without authorization is an insult 
 
Borrowing of language forms form 
another group is permissible and 
encouraged 
 Showing emotions during conflict is 
perceived as honesty and as the first 
step toward the resolution of a 
problem 
 
Showing emotions during conflict is 
perceived as the beginning of a 
“fight” and an interference to 
conflict resolution 
 
Unfamiliarity with cultural communication differences can lead to misin-
terpretation, misunderstanding and even unintentional insult. For example, the 
African American student who shows little reserve in stating his or her feel-
ings may be misperceived as hostile, or perhaps as dangerous. The student, 
meanwhile, may see himself or herself as an honest person willing to share 
feelings as a necessary first step in resolving problems. 
Similarly, the African American student who looks away from speakers 
during conversation may be erroneously perceived as showing disrespect or 
not paying attention. The African American student who freely states his or 
her position to the teacher may be perceived as challenging the teacher's 
authority when the student may be demonstrating honesty and pride in the 
value of his or her opinion. 
1. Be aware of words, images and situations that suggest that all or most 
members of a racial group are the same. 
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Example: “Why can't Joe ever be on time?”, “He's African American,  
isn’t he?” 
2. Avoid using qualifiers that reinforce racial and ethnic stereotypes. 
Example: “The articulate African American student” implies that 
African American students typically have low verbal skills.  
3. Avoid racial identification except when it is essential to communication. 
Example:  “Judy, an outgoing student” is preferable to “Judy, an 
outgoing African American female student”. 
4. Be aware of possible negative implications of color symbolism and 
usage that could offend people or reinforce bias. 
Example: Terms such as “black magic” or “black market” can be 
offensive. 
5. Avoid language that has questionable racial or ethnic connotations. 
Example: Phrases such as “culturally deprived”, “culturally dis- 
advantaged” and “you people” have racist overtones. 
 With respect to changing communicative behaviors which violate the cul-
tural rules of others, the following strategies may be useful: 
1. Be aware of rules for attentiveness during conversation. 
Example: The constant maintenance of eye contact while listening 
during a conversation often violates a conversational rule in working 
class African American and Hispanic cultures. 
2. Be aware of rules regarding the distance between speakers during 
conversation. 
Example: In some cultures, speakers stand close enough to touch often. In 
other cultures, distance is maintained to denote respect. 
3.  Be aware that objects, characters and symbols may reflect different 
beliefs or values for different groups. 
Example: The confederate flag and Uncle Remus stories may offend 
African Americans because they reflect the culture of slavery and the Old 
South. 
4. Be aware that cultures may vary in what they consider humorous or taboo. 
Example: Ethnic humor is often perceived by many groups as evidence of 
racial prejudice. Discussion of in group cultural rules and 
behaviors with outsiders is considered taboo within many cultures. 
5. Be aware of different rules for taking turns during conversations. 
Example: African American children frequently perceive “breaking in”   
to reinforce or disagree with another s point to be perfectly permissible, 
indeed desirable. 
6. Cultures may use  different  standards for  loudness, speed  of  delivery,  
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 silence, attentiveness and time to respond to another's point. 
 Example: Many Native American societies place high value on  
contemplation and tend, therefore, to feel little responsibility to 
 make immediate responses during conversation. 
7. Be aware of different cultural rules for entering into conversations in 
progress. 
Example: African American students tend to consider conversations as 
private between recognized participants. Therefore, anyone, including the 
teacher, who "butts in " is viewed as an eavesdropper and rebuked. 
One way to improve relationships across cultural lines, particularly in the 
upper grades, is to develop a unit on "Communicating with One Another." 
The purpose of such a unit would be to teach students how to communicate 
more effectively across cultural lines and how to address and negotiate dif-
ferences. 
It is also useful for teachers to brainstorm with one another on how to 
remove communication barriers. In addition, a well designed staff develop-
ment program can lead to better relations among staff and generate effective 
cross cultural communication activities for the classroom. 
It can also be useful for teachers to ask parents to identify sources of 
miscommunication and socially offensive behavior or language. Parents may 
be asked to suggest ways that school personnel can improve communication 
with students, adults and the communities. 
While schools have a responsibility to teach students the behavioral codes 
of the society at large and to expect students to adhere to them, they have a 
similar responsibility to reduce culturally induced discipline problems and to 
avoid misinterpreting cultural differences as behavioral problems. 
EXERCISES 
Discuss the following: 
1. The social nature of speech. 
1.1.  Do concepts only exist when there is specific linguistic evidence for 
them? Prove it. 
1.2   Does language influence thought? 
1.3. Social constraints on speech. 
1.4. What is social interaction? 
1.5. What are disciplines involved in the study of speech as a part of social 
interaction? 
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2. The classification of speech. 
2.1. What is phatic communion? 
2.2. Performative utterances. 
2.3. Bases for classification of speech-acts. 
2.4. Why is the variation of speech-acts socially very important? 
3. Speech as skilled work. 
3.1. Prove that speech can be considered as skilled work. 
3.2. The theory of face. 
3.3. The focussed and unfocussed social interaction. 
4. The norms governing speech. 
4.1. What are the norms governing speech in your country? 
4.2. Cultural Differences in Discourse. 
4.3. Tactics for Removing Cross Cultural Communication Barriers. 
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